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“… the most pertinent measures of the distribution of material living 
standards are probably based on jointly considering the income, 
consumption and wealth position of households or individuals.” 
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (2009) 
I. Introduction
There is growing debate, both social and academic, concerning the possibility of levying 
an annual wealth tax (henceforth, WT) (Iara, 2015). This debate has been sparked as 
much by the large and increasing disparities in the concentration of wealth as by the 
technological improvements that could address some of the potential challenges of 
levying such a tax. In this paper, taking advantage of the Spanish experience – today the 
only EU country with a WT – we quantitatively analyse the redistributive effect of this 
tax, but also examine elements of its current design that might be undermining its 
potential redistributive impact1. 
Concerns about inequality and low social mobility have become accentuated in recent 
years as the distribution of income and wealth has become more unequal, especially in 
the wake of the Great Recession. Over the last three decades, income inequality has 
grown in most OECD countries resulting in concern about the impact that growing 
differences between rich and poor might have on social cohesion. Some voices have 
even stressed the negative impact that inequality can have not just on society’s poorest 
but also on ensuring stable economic growth (OECD, 2015). It has been argued that this 
negative effect results, in large part, from the limitations faced by the poorest segments 
of the population for investing in their education and skills. Likewise, the IMF has 
underlined the important association between less inequality and greater 
macroeconomic stability and more sustainable growth (Lagarde, 2012). Although no 
empirical studies to date allow us to affirm that greater inequality is the cause of lower 
growth, the importance of inclusive economic growth as an objective of economic policy 
has been recognised (Fuest, Neumeier and Stöhlker, 2018). 
Studies of inequality show that household wealth is much more unequally distributed 
than household income due to very high levels of wealth concentration at the top of the 
distribution (OECD, 2015, Ch. 6). As Table 1 shows, wealth concentration is high 
everywhere in the world, but that there are marked differences between countries. The 
most obvious case is that of the US, where the top 10% of households accumulate 
almost 80% of total household wealth. Yet, this high concentration has not always been 
the case (see, for example, Piketty, 2014, Ch. 10). After 1910, wealth concentration in 
Europe began to fall at a much faster rate than it did in the US, so that by the sixties, it 
was higher on the new continent. Moreover, an increasing trend in wealth 
concentration in the US has apparently been documented since the beginning of the 
eighties, although the actual outcomes depend crucially on the statistical technique 
1 While Saez and Zucman (2019b) have discussed in detail some of these shortcomings, including 
references for the Spanish case, here we offer precise quantifications of their impact.  
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employed to calculate concentration ratios (Kopczuk, 2015). In Spain, our case study 
here, wealth concentration is not especially high when compared to the ratios 
presented by most other OECD countries, but the Great Recession has had its impact: 
thus, between 2005 and 2014, a 7 percentage-point rise was recorded for the top 1% 
(11 p.p. for the top 10%) (Anghel et al., 2018). All in all, not only is wealth inequality 
high, but recent trends seem to point to even greater levels of inequality or, at least, to 
a gap that is not being closed. It is for this reason that “the extent to which the well-off 
are going to rely on work versus rely on the returns to their wealth in the future is clearly 
important for assessing the extent to which a society will view itself as in some way a 
meritocracy” (Kopczuk, 2015, p. 47).  
To mitigate the negative impact of such a scenario, various authors have proposed the 
introduction of a WT. Piketty (2014, Ch. 15) proposed a “global capital tax”, since tax 
base mobility is a key constraint for maximizing the effectiveness of this tax at the 
national level2. Atkinson (2015) identified a “re-examination of the case for an annual 
wealth tax and the prerequisites for its successful introduction” (p. 201) as an idea to 
pursue, although a few years earlier the Mirrlees Review had reported being contrary to 
such an option (Boadway, Chamberlain and Emmerson, 2010). More recently, Saez and 
Zucman (2019a, 2019b) have examined the case for the US, including the prerequisites 
cited by Atkinson, and estimated its impact. The aim of this paper is to complement this 
literature with a simulation analysis of the WT based on the Spanish experience, the sole 
EU country in which this is possible. This analysis focuses specifically on the long-run 
redistributive role of the tax. In Section II, we briefly discuss the respective advantages 
and disadvantages of the WT and review the main legal elements that need to be 
considered in its design in order to maximise the tax’s positive impact. Traditional 
perspectives have to be reconsidered in the light of new technology advances, which 
usher in talk of a “modern wealth tax”. 
We are able to perform our simulation analysis thanks to the construction of a tax 
simulator (the so-called SIMPA) based on the Survey of Household Finances of the Bank 
of Spain (see, for example, Bover, Coronado and Velilla, 2014)3. This survey, conducted 
every three years since 2002, contains information about 6,120 households, with top 
households being overrepresented. We exploit the 2014 survey, which is the latest one 
available. These survey data allow us to consider all the details of the Spanish WT, 
enabling us to analyse the impact of the pertinent legal factors on redistribution. The 
Survey of Household Finances also allows us to compare the actual amount of tax 
revenue collected (external data) with the estimated amount that could potentially be 
collected. This should prove useful both for assessing the current role played by the tax 
and for guiding reforms in Spain and in other countries based on this experience. 
According to our simulator, the current WT revenues collected account for just 39.2% of 
the estimated total that should be collected. In other words, potential revenues are 2.5 
times greater than real revenues, which means the weight of the tax with respect to 
2 Note this is not necessarily the case for the US, as the personal tax system is not based on the residence 
principle, but on nationality. 
3 https://www.bde.es/bde/en/areas/estadis/estadisticas-por/encuestas-
hogar/relacionados/Encuesta_Financi/  
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GDP could be raised from the current 0.18 to 0.46%. One reason for this sizable 
difference is that in the survey all assets are valued at market prices, but this is not 
always the case under the prevailing law for assets such as real property or closely-held 
businesses, two assets that alone account for 75% of overall household wealth in Spain. 
A further reason for this large shortfall could be tax evasion. Based on information 
contained in the 2014 universe of WT returns for Catalonia, Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, 
Mas-Montserrat and Salvadori (2019) estimated a “tax gap” of 44.34% for that Spanish 
region4. 
From the survey data, we calculate that the top 1% (10%) hold 19.45% (51.63%) of total 
net wealth. And while the redistributive effect of the WT in the short run is low, when a 
long-run perspective is adopted the level of redistribution is notable, with concentration 
ratios falling to 18.14% (50.79%) after 25 years and to 15.19% (48.88%) after 85 years. 
Note, we show the impact over such long periods of time in order to illustrate how 
difficult it is to achieve reductions in wealth concentration.  
The general threshold of the net WT in Spain is relatively modest, fixed at € 700,000. 
Such a threshold could create liquidity constraints for taxpayers, that is, when their 
wealth is high but their income low. To avoid this, there is a ceiling on WT liability, which 
along with personal income tax (PIT) liability cannot exceed a certain percentage of the 
taxpayer’s annual inflow of income. Legally speaking, the ceiling on WT and PIT liabilities 
is derived from the Spanish Constitution, which holds that the tax system cannot 
become confiscatory. Under WT rules, first dwellings, up to a maximum value, and 
family business assets are also exempt. Leaving aside the impact of these two elements 
on tax avoidance (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat, 2019) and evasion 
(Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, Mas-Montserrat and Salvadori, 2019), the combination of 
both benefits severely tames the redistributive power of the tax (i.e., these benefits are 
regressive with respect to wealth). According to our calculations, the importance of the 
tax ceiling is twice that of the family business exemption, which in turn is considerably 
more important than the exemption on first dwellings. All in all, the negative impact of 
these elements needs to be taken seriously into account if the objective is to use this 
tax as a redistributive tool. We propose and simulate reforms with a comprehensive tax 
base in order to avoid such loopholes but, in general, we maintain the tax ceiling, given 
that the principle of non-confiscation is a legal requisite. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we discuss the arguments 
forwarded in the literature in favour and against the wealth tax, and we also examine 
the Spanish experience. In Section III, we summarise the main legal elements of Spain’s 
wealth tax and we present the tax simulator used to analyse the current operation of 
the Spanish tax. In Section IV, we analyse the redistributive effect of the current wealth 
tax and of some of its specific elements, and we also assess several alternative reforms. 
Section V concludes. 
4 It might be tempting to conclude that the difference in the two tax gaps (i.e. 60.8-44.3%) is attributable 
to the assessment criteria employed, which indeed have been shown to be quite important (Durán-Cabré 
and Esteller-Moré, 2007). However, although Kopczuk (2015, p. 50) claims that survey data may not be 
affected by evasion, we cannot be sure, particularly with regard to offshore accounts. 
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II. The wealth tax: a critical appraisal  
 
1. General review  
 
One of the advantages of a WT is its potential role as a “self-checking mechanism” 
(Kaldor, 1956); that is, the information contained in a WT return should be useful for 
controlling capital income compliance in the PIT and even in the inheritance and gift tax 
or, at least, it should serve as a “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes” (Shoup, 1956). 
However, serious doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of this role. In fact, 
it may mean just the contrary: third-party reporting is key to ensuring WT compliance, 
as is already the case with current income taxes. For this reason, in the case of a 
“modern wealth tax”, third-party information should cover the widest set of assets and 
debts as possible (see Saez and Zucman, 2019a, section 4). Otherwise, tax evasion not 
only reduces potential WT revenues but also its redistributive power, as we show in 
Section III.3 below.  
 
Wealth gives its owners an additional economic capacity – including greater security, 
status or power – to that afforded by their income. This means that any tax on this 
wealth requires the periodic valuation of assets at their corresponding market value; 
however, this is far from straightforward because assets are being valued solely for tax 
purposes and not as part of a market transaction (Sandford, 1995). This difficulty affects, 
in particular, such assets as real property, closely-held businesses and works of art, and 
has traditionally been considered an important drawback for the levying of a WT. The 
accuracy of such valuations could only be achieved by incurring high administrative and 
compliance costs. In determining the choice of valuation methods, the Meade 
Committee (1978) identifies the two major considerations to be borne in mind: i) the 
need to keep administrative and compliance costs as low as possible and ii) the need to 
employ methods that minimize uncertainty. And it concludes that “these considerations 
should on occasion take precedence over the desire to obtain a genuine open-market 
valuation”5. This is particularly relevant in the case of real estates values, as cadastral 
values are typically not up-to-date with market prices, which undermines the tax’s 
horizontal equity6. Yet, a “modern wealth tax” should be able to take advantage of the 
latest computer and information technology in devising a better approach to valuation 
(Gamage, 2019). Indeed, the technology for systematically obtaining reliable real 
property values exists and could be adopted by the tax administration (Saez and 
Zucman, 2019b). 
 
                                                     
5 In 1974, a Labour Government came to power in the United Kingdom committed to introducing a WT. 
The idea, however, was criticised by scholars otherwise sympathetic to some kind of redistribution of 
wealth, including Atkinson and Sandford, because the administrative costs and the difficulty of assessing 
wealth annually for tax purposes made it impractical (Glennerster, 2012).  
6 In 1995, the German Constitutional Court declared the WT unconstitutional, because the law gave 
unequal treatment to different types of wealth: some assets were valued according to their market value; 
others were assessed using values that were well removed from their market price. For example, real 
property valuations dated from 1964 (Wendt, 1997). 
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Additionally, tax base mobility (in those cases where the WT is based on the residence 
principle) and the existence of tax havens might make it difficult to enforce tax 
compliance. This would require a “global capital tax” (Piketty, 2014) or some form of tax 
coordination (Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2013). Indeed, recent advances in information 
sharing between countries (FATCA, the Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation, or the OECD Global Forum) constitute what Iara 
(2015) refers to as a “new paradigm” insofar as it might facilitate tax compliance in a 
globalized world. Thus, there are reasons for the proponents of the wealth tax to be 
optimistic. 
 
While the market-based valuation of assets and the availability of third-party 
information at both national and international levels are important, there are other 
issues that need to be considered in relation to the tax base. Exemptions on certain 
assets can undermine the redistributive power of the WT, as taxpayers (typically the 
super-wealthy) are likely to exploit them by building their wealth portfolios so as to 
minimise the tax bill7. It is for this reason that Saez and Zucman (2019a, 2019b) propose 
a comprehensive tax base that includes all asset classes and which avoids behavioural 
responses that might erode the tax.  
 
Another key design element concerns the potential liquidity constraints resulting from 
taxing a stock variable. To address this issue, some countries introduced a tax ceiling, 
whereby the sum of the income and wealth tax liabilities is not allowed to exceed a 
certain percentage of an individual’s income. However, as with exemptions, rich 
taxpayers are likely to devise ways of reducing their income to take advantage of this 
limit. A very large WT threshold would avoid this possibility, since a priori the very top 
taxpayers should not be affected by such liquidity constraints. Nevertheless, if taxpayers 
were to face this problem (e.g. a taxpayer whose wealth consists basically of assets from 
an early-stage business that is not yet profitable), Gamage (2019) proposes an 
alternative course of action: namely, offering the option of a limited deferral regime for 
certain kinds of assets in conjunction with deferral-interest charges8.  
 
Although the WT can have a real impact (just as the capital income tax does) – among 
others, on capital stock, entrepreneurial innovation, top talent migration, charitable 
giving and even family structure (as reviewed by Saez and Zucman, 2019a, section 3) – 
it is claimed that the WT might play a complementary role to a PIT. That is, the two taxes 
are not fully interchangeable9. This is because a capital income tax is not able to tax full 
income, basically due to the existence of unrealized capital gains10. This means the 
wealth portfolios of the super-rich are usually managed through a holding company (or 
                                                     
7 In the French annual WT, eliminated in 2018, the tax base did not include certain financial assets and 
some business assets. In fact, the base represented just half of the wealth held by WT taxpayers (Boadway 
and Pestieau, 2018). 
8 In line with Glogower’s (2016) proposal for taxing capital as an alternative to the realization rule. 
9 When rates of returns on capital across individuals differ, wealth taxation and capital income taxation 
are not equivalent and have different implications for both efficiency and equity. Guvenen et al. (2019) 
show that a WT leads to a more efficient allocation of capital than a capital income tax, as entrepreneurs 
that are more productive pay similar taxes regardless of their productivity, which shifts the tax burden 
toward unproductive entrepreneurs.  
10 See Appendix 1.  
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other legal entity) in such a way that they receive a sufficient annual income flow to 
cover their private consumption (Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2013). And although they 
will eventually have to pay these taxes, deferral constitutes an advantage for them. 
Hence, a wealth tax should contribute to the principle of fair taxation. On top of that, 
the simple possession of wealth (independently of financial profitability) might confer 
utility on taxpayers, which would justify the taxation of these assets in the WT, or 
alternatively the imputation of an annual rent in the PIT. On the whole, for the very rich, 
capital is a better indicator than income of their ‘contributive capacity’ (Piketty, 2014). 
The recommendation made by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (2009) quoted at 
the beginning of this paper also goes in the direction of including wealth as a measure 
of living standards. 
 
 
2. Spanish review 
 
With the restoration of democracy in 1977, and the establishment of a modern tax 
system, Spain introduced an annual WT. At that time, it was intended as a transitory tax, 
but it continues in force today. The main reason for its adoption lays in its role as a “self-
checking mechanism” (as described in the previous section), but it was also introduced 
due to its redistributive power and as a complement to the PIT.  
 
Spain’s WT was actually abolished by the socialist government in 2008, on the grounds 
that it had failed to achieve its redistributive goals; but, by the end of 2011, due to the 
crisis of the public finances, it was reintroduced. The surprising argument offered in 
justification by the left-wing central executive – surprising insofar as the 2011 tax had 
not been redesigned, and so the tax’s drawbacks remained – was that those with more 
resources should be made to contribute more to the economic recovery, and by so doing 
this would reinforce equity and allow a better redistribution of income and wealth.  
 
In Section III.1, we describe in some detail the main legal elements making up the 
Spanish tax. Suffice it here to say that it is a decentralised tax, which means that Spain’s 
regions or Autonomous Communities (ACs) can modify such legal parameters as the 
minimum threshold and the tax schedule and enact tax credits; however, the definition 
of the tax base (including exemptions) and the definition of the tax ceiling are both fixed 
by national law. 
 
As well as the obvious fraud risk associated with low rates of tax control (Durán-Cabré 
and Esteller-Moré, 2010), many experts highlight the inefficiencies and inequities 
resulting from the design of this tax (i.e. assessment rules that differ from market prices, 
tax exemptions, etc.). Apart from giving rise to horizontal inequities between taxpayers 
with similar levels of net wealth but with different asset portfolios, the specific 
characteristics of the WT significantly distort its incidence and redistributive role given 
that it is primarily the richest taxpayers who benefit from them (see, for example, 
Arcarons and Calonge, 2007; Alvaredo and Saez, 2009).  
 
Recently, Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, Mas-Montserrat and Salvadori (2019) have 
estimated a 44.34% “tax gap” for Catalonia, with underreporting constituting the main 
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source of the gap (97.3% of the total gap). Specifically, underreported offshore financial 
assets (58% of the total gap due to underreporting) and the inappropriate application of 
the family business exemption (37%) are the main underreporting mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the tax gap is mostly concentrated among the richest taxpayers: richest 
decile’s gap accounts for almost 75% of the total gap.  
 
Given the persuasive nature of these arguments, both Esteller-Moré (2013) and the 
White Report, the “Lagares Report” (2014, pp. 224-240) have advocated the definitive 
abolition of the tax. However, in this paper, taking the existence of such a tax as given, 
we evaluate its redistributive performance under its current legal design and propose 
and evaluate alternative reforms. An analysis of this kind should be useful for reforming 
the tax; otherwise, its abolition would appear to be the best solution. However, it is our 
contention that from a political economy perspective, the role the tax might play can be 
considered in terms of the visualisation of the efforts made by the public sector at 
reducing large wealth concentration disparities. 
 
 
III. An analysis of the redistributive power of the Spanish net wealth tax 
using a tax simulator (SIMPA): a long-run perspective 
 
1. How the tax is currently designed 
 
Taxable wealth is net wealth, that is, the monetary value of all non-exempt assets minus 
debts. In Spain, net wealth is assessed every December 31st, but in order to mitigate any 
tax avoidance incentives (e.g., in the case of bank accounts, withdrawing money on 
December 30th) or to tame high valuation volatility (basically, that of publicly listed 
shares), the value of some assets is calculated as the average over the last quarter. The 
law provides specific valuation criteria for most assets, the values of which however can 
be quite distinct from their market price. This applies particularly to real estate, where 
for tax purposes the highest value between the acquisition price and the cadastral value 
is taken. In the case of the shares of entities that are not publicly traded, their value is 
usually calculated in accordance with the company’s balance sheet, that is, applying 
accounting criteria. The unit of taxation is the individual (not firms or households), so 
family wealth has to be allocated among members of the family.   
 
Apart from the standard exemptions, such as public and private pension plans and 
human capital, other assets are exempt: those belonging to Spain’s historical heritage 
as well as works of art and antiques (as long as their value does not exceed a certain 
figure). However, the two main exemptions are that of the first dwelling – up to a 
maximum of € 300,000 per taxpayer – and that of equity affected by economic activities 
and participations in certain entities, that is, the exemption of family-owned or closely-
held businesses. In this latter case, to be eligible for the exemption certain criteria must 
be met: namely, that there is an economic activity, conducted by the owner of the assets 
or by a close relative; that, as a consequence of this activity, the individual obtains 
income that constitutes his main source of revenue; and, in the case of incorporated 
activities, that the owner, individually or with a close group of family members, holds a 
minimum participation in the capital of the entity. 
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The Spanish WT is only levied on taxable wealth exceeding a minimum threshold – 
currently fixed at €700,000 – although this can vary across the ACs. WT returns have to 
be submitted in two circumstances: (i) when taxpayers have a positive tax liability, or (ii) 
when, although their tax liability is zero because their net taxable wealth is below the 
threshold, their gross wealth (including both taxable and non-taxable assets) is above 2 
million euros. Tax liability is obtained by applying progressive tax rates to the net tax 
base, i.e. taxable wealth minus the minimum threshold. The WT rates set nationally 
range from 0.2 to 2.5%; though, again, they may differ across the ACs. Moreover, there 
is a limit on WT liability: the sum of PIT and WT liabilities cannot exceed 60% of the PIT 
base. If it does, the WT due is reduced, although this reduction cannot exceed 80% of 
the original tax liability; in other words, at least 20% of the original WT due must be 
paid11. Likewise, when applying the ceiling a number of specific criteria apply: for 
instance, long-term capital gains (i.e. greater than one year) are not taken into account, 
although they form part of the legal definition of taxable income.  
 
The ACs can also apply tax credits, which are deducted from gross tax liability, as the AC 
of Madrid has done since 2011, where there is a 100% tax credit. In other words, its 
residents do not pay the tax. The ACs of the Basque Country and Navarre, which for 
historical reasons operate a different regional financing system, have full tax autonomy, 
although in broad terms the tax is similar in its application to the rest of Spain.  
 
Overall, the current Spanish tax system is vulnerable to both tax avoidance, given the 
existence of various loopholes, and tax evasion, given the existence of these same 
loopholes but also a lax enforcement policy. While these two issues have been widely 
identified and discussed in the literature, no single quantitative analysis has examined 
their impact on redistribution and on the revenues collected. This is something we seek 
to do in the next section.   
 
 
2. SIMPA: the tax simulator 
 
In order to analyse both the real and potential role of Spain’s wealth tax, we have 
developed a tax simulator: SIMPA (for details of its construction, see Durán-Cabré and 
Esteller-Moré, 2019). The basic data are taken from the Bank of Spain’s Survey of 
Household Finances12, providing information about household wealth and income. 
Recall income data are critical for applying – where necessary – the WT tax ceiling. Here, 
we outline the six basic steps we take in the simulator: 
 
                                                     
11 The design of this ceiling cannot be modified by ACs. 
12 Alternatives are available, including the capitalisation of capital income from the PIT returns or the 
inheritance multiplier. However, they both have their drawbacks. In the case of the former, too many 
assumptions are made (e.g., profitability is assumed to be the same across the income distribution, while 
unrealized capital gains cannot be capitalised), while the latter is simply not available for all the ACs as 
the inheritance and gift tax is decentralised. In any case, according to the comparative analysis carried out 
by Martínez-Toledano (2017), the Survey of Household Finances is extremely useful for analysing 
inequality dynamics at the top (p. 28). See also Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré (2019) for further 
arguments in support of this choice. 
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1) We calculate net wealth and net income by household (i.e. the survey’s unit of 
response). 
2) We transform these magnitudes to the taxpayer level using the fiscal concept of 
“splitting”, where the household comprises a married couple. 
3) We apply, where the legal conditions hold, the exemptions in the WT return (first 
dwelling and family business) and, additionally, the deductions applicable to 
each tax base (contributions to private pension plans in the PIT; and the general 
threshold for the WT – amounting currently to 700,000 euros) to obtain the net 
taxable base. 
4) We apply, in the case of the PIT, the general and savings tax schedules to the 
taxable bases and the personal and family minimum deductions to obtain the 
gross tax liability (before tax credits), which we need to determine for the PIT-
WT ceiling; and we apply the progressive tax schedule to the taxable wealth. 
5) We verify if the WT tax liability needs to be reduced by the application of the tax 
ceiling. 
6) Finally, once we have the WT due at the taxpayer level, we transform it to the 
household level to calculate all the inequality indices. 
 
 
3. The redistributive power of the tax: a long-run perspective 
 
In the case of the WT, the tax due is a flow of income, while the tax base is a stock 
magnitude. This means effective tax rates calculated as a percentage of net wealth are 
low if we compare them, for example, with those of PIT. However, this is not a fair 
comparison because of the different nature of wealth versus that of income. In addition, 
as the accumulation of wealth is a process that occurs in the long term, we propose 
evaluating the redistributive capacity of the tax in the long term as well. Indeed, this is 
how we present the results of our simulations in relation to redistribution. 
 
Specifically, for a given WT, we calculate the effective average tax rate to be paid in the 
first year. This we denominate as the “short-run” tax rate, ATR_s/r. From this, we 
calculate an effective long-run ATR as follows: 
 
Net Wealth in year t without a WT (NW_w/o) = NW0 x (1+g)t 
 
Net Wealth in year t with a WT (NW_w) = NW0 x (1+g)t x (1–ATR_s/r)t 
 
NW0 is the net wealth in the base year, which in the absence of a WT, would increase 
annually according to the factor, g, over t-years until NW_w/o has been accumulated. 
The value of g depends on the capacity to generate annual savings, but it is also 
dependent on the evolution of asset values (e.g. stock indices or housing market)13. We 
assume g is constant across the wealth distribution and over time. In the presence of a 
WT, given a constant ATR over time, which coincides with the effective tax rate of the 
base year, net wealth in the long run will diminish. Given these two scenarios (with and 
without WT), we can calculate the implicit long-run effective average WT rate as follows: 
                                                     
13 For the US, according to available empirical evidence, the increase in wealth accumulation at the top 
has been driven by a rise in asset prices rather than by capital accumulation (Saez and Zucman, 2019b).  
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ATR_l/r = 1 – (NW_w/NW_w/o) = 1 – (1–ATR_s/r)t 
 
Hence, in our simulations, we present the effective average tax rate in both the short 
and long runs. To measure the capacity to collect tax revenues, we use the short run; 
however, for redistribution purposes, we believe it much more appropriate to calculate 
the long-run effective tax rate. In fact, within such a dynamic context, in order to 
determine whether the tax is progressive or not, it is not sufficient to compare the 
average tax rates across the wealth distributions if the g factor is likely to evolve 
differently across groups of taxpayers14. Specifically, if we allow a different g, the 
progressivity condition becomes: 
 
ATR_s/r(1%) (1+ g1%) – ATR_s/r(99%) (1+ g99%) > (–1)  g99% 
 
where, by way of example, we compare the ATR of the top 1% versus the rest of 
taxpayers (99%), but also the g for the top 1% versus the rest. The parameter  indicates 
just how much larger the annual increase in the stock of wealth of the top 1% is versus 
that of the rest. Thus, if =1, there is no difference, and progressivity is guaranteed over 
time as long as ATR_s/r(1%)< ATR_s/r(99%). Therefore, if we are concerned with 
redistribution in the long run, the differences in average tax rates should take into 
account the potential divergence in wealth accumulation, so that ATR_s/r(1%)< 
ATR_s/r(99%) is no guarantee of long-run redistribution. In our simulations, we consider 
the case where =1. 
 
 
IV. Analysis of the redistributive power of the wealth tax under current 
and alternative designs 
 
1. The current tax  
 
When applying the current WT rules (exemptions, threshold, tax rates and common 
ceiling) to the taxpayers’ wealth value at market prices (Survey of Household Finances), 
our results, calculated with SIMPA, show that the potential tax revenue for the base year 
is 3,691,968.5 thousand €, that is, 39.21% of the real revenue (panel A Table 2)15. In 
other words, the potential revenue is 2.5 greater than the real revenue. Yet, despite 
these much higher revenues, the short-run effective tax rates are very low both before 
and after applying the tax ceiling, 0.058 and 0.0352%, respectively. However, there is a 
notable shift in effective tax rates if we adopt a long-run perspective (panels B and C 
                                                     
14 The different composition of wealth portfolios across wealth groups (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 
2019) is a key element that might guide the future evolution of g (due to different asset prices variations) 
across wealth groups. The WT specifically seeks to reduce increases in the concentration of the net wealth 
of the top taxpayers (Saez and Zucman, 2019a, section 3.1). 
15 As Madrid has a 100% tax credit, in order to make a homogenous comparison, we add the money it 
would have collected had the AC applied the WT to the real revenue raised by the other ACs. We take the 
real revenue raised by Madrid in 2007, the last year the WT was applied before its transitional abolition 
between 2008–2010, and assume it would have evolved in line with the revenue collected in Catalonia up 
to 2014. The two are Spain’s richest regions.  
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Table 2). The effective tax rates rise to 0.832% (5.70% for those with a positive tax due) 
after 25 years and to 2.49% (17.04%) after a very long period of time, in this case 85 
years. Consequently, the redistributive effect, which although negligible in the short run, 
is in fact quite significant: the wealth concentration of the top 1% (10%) falls by 1.31 pp 
(0.84 pp) after 25 years.  
 
Regardless of this temporal perspective, only 0.97% of the adult population – i.e. 2.01% 
of households – have to pay the tax. As Table 3 indicates, only households located at the 
very top of the wealth distribution are liable: that is, from the 94 percentile upwards. In 
fact, 92% of the total tax due should be paid by the top 1% of taxpayers. The huge 
disparity should also be noted within this 100% percentile, as the net wealth goes from 
€ 2M to € 524M. Likewise, note that not everyone located in the top 1% of the wealth 
distribution becomes a taxpayer: 11.69% of households would not have to pay the tax. 
This highly surprising result is attributable to the exemptions, which across the common 
ceiling PIT-WT, undoubtedly reduce the redistributive power of the WT, as the figures 
described below show. 
 
In GRAPH 116, we show the evolution of the short-run average tax rate over net wealth, 
before (blue) and after (diamond) the application of the ceiling, while in GRAPH 2, we 
show the difference between these two average tax rates. In general, it is evident that 
the impact of the limit is regressive, as the difference in tax rates is increasing with net 
wealth. A good example of regressivity – clearly visible in GRAPH 1 – is provided by a 
taxpayer whose net wealth is € 152M: here, the final tax rate falls from 2.43 to 0.49% 
when the ceiling is considered. This is as expected, given, as stressed in Section II.1, the 
flow of income of the very rich does not match their level of wealth. In other words, the 
two magnitudes do not move monotonically. Paradoxically, this means that the tax itself 
tames its redistributive power. This suggests the need to define the ceiling in a different 
fashion, either by implicitly raising the general threshold or by changing the formula 
used to calculate the ceiling17. Failure to do so represents a lack of coherence with the 
tax’s original purpose18.  
 
GRAPH 1 also highlights a further peculiarity: the average tax rates of the richest 
taxpayers (with € 262M of net wealth) are extremely low, both before (0.24%) and after 
(0.1%) the application of the ceiling. Therefore, the low short-run final rate is 
attributable primarily to the application of specific exemptions (first dwelling and family 
business) and not to the ceiling. This is what  
 
 
                                                     
16 In the graphs, each dot is a survey response. In SIMPA, each response is elevated to the factor provided 
by the survey for transforming individual data into the national aggregate.  
17 This negative assessment of the ceiling does not take into account the fact that it creates margins of 
avoidance response (by redesigning the wealth portfolio not to take into consideration general annual 
flows of income, but rather capital gains) as shown by Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat 
(2019). 
18 In the Spanish case recall that the Constitution, Art. 31.1, holds that the tax system should be 
progressive but without becoming confiscatory. Although the Constitutional Court in Spain has not ruled 
on the practical consequences of this non-confiscatory principle, the suggestion is that some kind of joint 
limit between PIT and WT needs to be considered. 
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GRAPH 3 illustrates: average tax rates over wealth without (blue) and with (green) the 
specific exemptions, while GRAPH 4 shows the percentage point reductions for each 
exemption: first dwelling (blue) and family business (green). As expected, the 
importance of the first dwelling exemption (for which there is an absolute ceiling) is 
lower than that of the family business exemption (for which there is no absolute limit).  
 
Thus, the results obtained with SIMPA suggest that both the exemptions and the 
common ceiling are regressive and so reduce the potential redistributive effect of the 
WT. This conclusion is confirmed in two additional graphs that show the reduction in 
ATR per net wealth bracket; specifically, GRAPH 5 distinguishes the effect of the first 
dwelling and family business exemptions, while GRAPH 6 distinguishes the effect of both 
exemptions and the tax ceiling. In all graphs, the scale of the vertical axis is the same 
across brackets, clearly illustrating where absolute reductions in the average tax rates 
concentrate most. If, for example, we compare the vertical axis of GRAPH 4 with that of 
GRAPH 2, it is evident that the percentage reductions for the specific exemptions are 
half those attributable to the ceiling.  
 
In short, the exemptions and common ceiling reduce the tax’s progressivity, this 
reduction being most marked in the case of the ceiling, while of the two exemptions, 
the family business exemption is considerably more important than that of the first 
dwelling.  
 
 
2. Some alternative designs 
 
In line with the conclusion that key elements of the current Spanish WT are regressive 
and undermine its redistributive effect19, it is logical that we consider alternative designs 
that ensure the regulation is more coherent with its redistributive goal. Our tax 
simulator, SIMPA, enables us to test the outcomes for a variety of reforms, some of 
which are shown in Appendix 2. In this section, we concentrate on three potential 
designs under the revenue equivalence assumption: i.e. that the total amount of 
revenue collected is equal to the potential amount of revenue collected under the 
current tax. The exact nature of the three reforms is shown in Table 4. In Simulations 1 
and 2, we do not consider any specific exemptions, while in Simulation 3 we consider 
solely the first dwelling exemption in line with its current legal configuration. Thus, 
based on redistributive grounds but also on the avoidance opportunities that it confers, 
we disregard the family business exemption in all three simulations. In Simulation 1 we 
do not contemplate any common PIT-WT ceiling; this, however, is included in the other 
two. The marginal tax rate remains constant in all cases at 1%, while the universal 
threshold is allowed to vary. As such, we propose a flat tax with a much higher general 
threshold, which introduces progressivity and, at least to a certain degree, avoids 
liquidity constraints, and a comprehensive tax base, which enhances the redistributive 
goal and reduces loopholes and behavioural responses. 
                                                     
19 Furthermore, although not specifically examined here, there is fairly strong evidence that these 
elements enhance the avoidance responses that effectively erode the tax (Alvaredo and Saez, 2009; 
Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat, 2019). 
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As can be seen in Table 5, there are no great differences across the three simulations. 
Effective tax rates in the short run are quite low: in those with a positive tax due, it 
stands between just 0.031 and 0.042%. The tax would be paid by between just 0.234 
and 0.7% of adult individuals, that is, between 0.47 and 1.47% of households. GRAPH 7 
shows the evolution of the concentration ratio for the top 1%. Again, although there are 
no great differences across simulations, Simulation 1 achieves slightly greater levels of 
redistribution, which highlights once more the need to rethink the design of the limit. 
For example, after 25 years, the wealth concentration of the top 1% would be 18, 18.2 
and 18.2% for Simulations 1, 2 and 3, respectively, where 19.45% is the starting point. 
Hence, in all cases, the reduction would be 1.25-1.45 p.p., which is slightly above the 
redistributive capacity of the current potential WT, as shown above in Table 2. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Society is subject to constant change and nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
field of taxation. Technological innovations (e.g., as with respect to the valuation of 
assets) and advances in information sharing – specially at the international level – could 
well open the door to a “modern wealth tax”, which would be good news if wealth 
inequality continues to record such high levels and to pose a potential threat to social 
cohesion. However, as WT design has still to overcome a number of challenges, in this 
paper, taking advantage of the Spanish experience, we have undertaken a quantitative 
analysis of various key legal elements of this tax (specifically, exemptions and the tax 
ceiling) and we have analysed its redistributive power in the long run. To do so, we have 
designed a tax simulator (the SIMPA). 
 
In its current design, our simulator suggests that the Spanish tax should achieve 
reasonable levels of long-run redistribution. Those outcomes, however, are merely 
potential, given that reality falls well short of this situation. For example, according to 
our simulator, under current legislation, the weight of the WT over GDP should be 
0.46%, that is, 2.6 times its current weight. This discrepancy, we argue herein, is due to 
the existence of both tax avoidance and evasion as well as to the fiscal assessment 
criteria employed, which do not necessarily coincide with market values. If these sources 
of discrepancy were to be rectified, in 25 years’ time, for example, the current tax could 
reduce the wealth concentration of the top 1% by 1.31 p.p. 
 
To address the sources of this discrepancy, the tax administration needs to take 
advantage of developing technologies to improve its valuation methods, while at the 
same time investing greater efforts in the fight against tax avoidance. In this latter 
instance, what is needed, as various authors have already stressed, is the elimination of 
existing loopholes. In this paper, we have specifically illustrated the regressive effects of 
the “family business” exemption, but also those of the common PIT-WT ceiling. While 
some kind of ceiling has to be left in place – to avoid the confiscatory tax system 
prohibited under the Spanish Constitution – its design needs to be rethought to avoid 
regressivity and its use as an avoidance tool (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-
Montserrat, 2019). 
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In short, the time is ripe to give serious consideration to the role a wealth tax might play 
in the tax system. While the current setting seems to welcome a “new paradigm”, recent 
experiences, such as that documented here for Spain, point to the fact that any flaws in 
its design can seriously undermine its redistributive role. If these flaws are not 
addressed, the tax will fail to achieve its basic goal: namely that of complementing the 
PIT by taxing the contributive capacity of the very wealthy.  
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TABLE 1. Concentration of Net Wealth (%). Selected OECD countries. 
  Australia Denmark France Germany Italy Spain USA UK 
Top 1%  15.00 23.62 18.65 23.66 11.69 16.32 42.48 20.05 
Top 10%  46.47 63.98 50.59 59.76 42.78 45.58 79.47 52.50 
Source: OECD Wealth Distribution Database; 2014 for all countries, except for Denmark (2015), Spain 
(2012) and the US (2016). 
 
 
TABLE 2. SIMPA: Inequality before and after the current tax 
 BEFORE WT 
AFTER POTENTIAL 
WT 
A: SHORT RUN IMPACT 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) n.a. 3,691,968.5 
% (Real Tax Revenue / Potential) n.a. 39.21 
Short run ATR (before/after tax 
ceiling)(%) 
n.a. 0.058/0.0352 
% individuals/households with tax due>0 n.a. 0.9659/2.015 
B: LONG RUN IMPACT (25 YEARS) 
Gini index 0.6609 0.6569 
Top 1% 19.45% 18.14% 
Top 10%  51.63% 50.79% 
Long run ATR (all/if tax due>0)(%) n.a. 0.832/ 5.701 
C: VERY LONG IMPACT (85 YEARS) 
Gini index 0.6609 0.6394 
Top 1% 19.45% 15.19% 
Top 10%  51.63% 48.88% 
Long run ATR (all/if tax due>0)(%) n.a. 2.49/17.04 
      n.a.: not applicable 
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TABLE 3. SIMPA: Potential distribution of household taxpayers  
P
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
 
Average 
Net Wealth 
(€) 
Minimum Net 
Wealth (€) 
Maximum 
Net Wealth 
(€) 
 
% 
Taxpayers 
within the 
Percentile 
% of Total 
Tax Due 
94 712,937 674,492 755,044 0.04 0.00009 
95 803,292 755,063 855,800  8.81 0.00533 
96 917,907 857,000 986,023   1.11 0.00692 
97 1,094,068 986,525 1,195,506 28.27 0.41 
98 1,323,794 1,195,860 1.488.011 17.05 0.74 
99 1,644,263 1,488,055 2,108,324 62.57 6.831 
100 5,053,378 2,110,405 524,000,000 88.31 91.99 
 
 
TABLE 4. SIMPA: Alternative simulations under equal-revenue collected constraint 
 SIMULATION 1 SIMULATION 2 SIMULATION 3 
Exemptions None None First dwelling 
Tax ceiling NO YES YES 
Threshold (€) 2,280,641 1,198,808.7 1,096,170 
Tax rate (%) 1 1 1 
 
 
TABLE 5. SIMPA: Redistributive power of alternative simulations in the very long run 
(85 years) 
 
POTENTIAL 
CURRENT WT 
SIMULATION 1 SIMULATION 2 SIMULATION 3 
Gini Index 0.6394 0.6392 0.6380 0.6380 
Top 1% 15.19% 15.02% 15.52% 15.57% 
Top 10% 48.88% 48.89% 48.66% 48.66% 
% revenue collected over 
potential revenue under 
current tax 
n.a. 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Short run ATR 
(before/after tax 
ceiling)(%) 
0.058/0.035 0.031/0.031 0.06/0.042  0.06/0.042 
Very long run ATR (total/ 
tax due>0)(%) 
2.49/17.04 2.03/31.73 3.00/24.69 2.96/23.78 
% individuals/households 
with tax due>0 
0.967/2.02 0.234/0.47 0.70/1.47 0.775/1.59 
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GRAPH 1. SIMPA: WT effective tax rate before and after the tax limit 
 
 
 
 
GRAPH 2. SIMPA: Reduction in the ATR attributable to the tax limit  
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GRAPH 3. SIMPA: WT effective tax rate before and after the first dwelling and family 
business exemptions (in all cases, after the limit)  
 
 
 
GRAPH 4. SIMPA: Reduction in the ATR for first dwelling and family business 
exemptions 
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GRAPH 5. SIMPA: Reduction of the ATR for first dwelling and family business exemptions per net wealth bracket  
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GRAPH 6. SIMPA: Reduction of the ATR for specific exemptions and tax limit per net wealth bracket  
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GRAPH 7. SIMPA: Evolution of the redistributive power of the WT over time: top 1% 
net wealth concentration 
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Appendix 1: How the WT can play the role of an unrealized capital gains 
tax  
 
In order to gain an idea of what reasonable WT rates might be if the aim is to mimic the 
potential role played by a non-existent unrealized capital gains tax (see Saez and 
Zucman, 2019b, Section 3.2), let’s consider an individual living in two periods. In the first 
period, his budget constraint is: 
 
𝑌1 × (1 − 𝑡𝑅) = 𝑆1 × (1 − 𝑡𝑊) + 𝐶1                                                                                  [A.1] 
 
where Y1 is labour income in period 1, tR is the effective tax rate on labour income, S1 
are private savings taxed at a WT rate, tW, and C1 is private consumption. In the second 
period, his constraint is: 
 
𝑆1 + 𝑆1 × 𝑟 × (1 − 𝑡𝑅) × 𝜃 + 𝑆1 × 𝑅 × (1 − 𝑡𝐺) × (1 − 𝜃) = 𝐶2 + 𝐵                       [A.2] 
 
where r is the interest rate (which coincides with the intertemporal discount rate), 𝜃 is 
the share of private savings that just generates financial returns, while the rest of assets 
only generate increases (i.e. capital gains), R>0, or decreases (capital losses), R<0, in the 
initial value of the assets. tG is the effective tax rate on capital gains and B is the value of 
bequests at the end of period 2. First, in order to focus just on the interaction between 
the capital gains tax and the WT, we do not consider the taxation of bequests. Second, 
we assume capital gains (as long as R>0) are not realized, and so in the absence of 
accrual taxation, they are not taxed. Hence, the role of B is making evident the existence 
of unrealized capital gains. The WT might then complement PIT. 
 
The WT rate that could play the role of an unrealized capital gains tax, given the 
existence of a capital income tax, would be: 
 
𝑡𝑊 = (1 − 𝜃) × {
𝑅×𝑡𝐺
1+𝑟×𝜃×(1−𝑡𝑅)+𝑅×(1−𝜃)×(1−𝑡𝐺)
}                                                                [A.3] 
 
Given the explicit objective we have established, there is no role for a WT, tW=0, as long 
as 𝜃 = 1, and the optimal capital income tax rate formula might then be guided by the 
rules set by Saez and Stantcheva (2018). Or, the other way around, the value of tW is 
decreasing in 𝜃.  
 
Let’s take Piketty’s (2014) Table 12.1, where the top 1%’s real growth rate of wealth per 
year is 6.8%. Then, if we take the Spanish capital income and the realized capital gains 
tax rate for top taxpayers (i.e. there is a progressive tax schedule), so that tR=tG=23%, 
and assume r=1.5%, GRAPH 8 shows the value of tW for different values of 𝜃. There is a 
negative linear relationship such that the maximum effective WT rate is 1.49%, and the 
minimum tax rate is 0%; for instance, for 𝜃=0.5, tW=0.75%. The values of tW hardly 
change if we vary the value of r. Similar results are obtained if all assets generate annual 
financial returns, and only some of them also general capital gains. In any case, this 
simple exercise was carried out to provide an idea of what would be reasonable values 
of tW as long as this tax seeks to complement the PIT returns to capital on the accrual 
25
  
basis. 
 
GRAPH 8. Reasonable effective WT rates 
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Appendix 2: Basic outcomes of further reforms using SIMPA 
 
1) No exemptions (neither first dwelling nor family business) and no tax ceiling 
g = 1% & years = 85  
 
Tax rate: 1% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.6609 0.6025 0.6236 0.6477 0.6533 
Top 1% 19.45% 11.29% 12.70% 17.05% 18.38% 
Top 10% 51.63% 43.10% 46.56% 50.11% 50.91% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 46,051,368 10,692,829 6,700,053 1,985,507 886,218 
Short run ATR (%) 0.194 0.1397 0.07466 0.01205 0.0045 
Long run ATR (total/tax due>0) 
(%) 
55.2 (57.4) 9.05 (35.6) 4.91 (32.52) 0.814 (27.84) 0.305 (28.26) 
 
Tax rate: 1.5% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.6638 0.5818 0.6114 0.6442 0.6519 
Top 1% 19.48% 8.49% 10.7% 16.2% 18.1% 
Top 10% 51.72% 39.95% 44.8% 49.7% 50.8% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 69,077,056 16,039,244 10,057,080 2,978,260 1,329,326 
Short run ATR (%) 1.44 0.21 0.31 0.02 0.0067 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
69.5 (72.3) 12.0 (47.2) 6.5 (43.4) 1.1 (37.6) 0.41 (38.2) 
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2) No exemptions (neither first dwelling nor family business), but tax ceiling applies 
g = 1% % & years = 85  
 
Tax rate: 1% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.6869 0.6163 0.6340 0.6514 0.6558 
Top 1% 25.27% 14.34% 15.11% 17.91% 18.97% 
Top 10% 55.57% 45.10% 48.05% 50.63% 51.26% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 41,704,720 7,929,810 4,445,104 1,151,836 321,179 
Short run ATR (%) 0.896/0.961 0.112/0.14 0.055/0.075 0.0065/0.012 0.002/0.005 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
52.07 (54.18) 7.64 (30.04) 3.85 (25.53)  0.489 (16.74) 0.1497 (13.88) 
 
 
Tax rate: 1.5% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.7278 0.6052 0.6282 0.65 0.65 
Top 1% 30.68% 13.19% 14.35% 17.59% 18.82% 
Top 10% 61.41% 43.32% 47.16% 50.44% 51.18% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 58,804,508 10,690,946 5,857,819 1,462,847 437,235 
Short run ATR (%) 1.29/1.44 0.15/0.21 0.071/0.112 0.0483/0.0181 0.002/0.007 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
63.95 (66.54) 9.48 (37.26) 4.75 (31.49) 6 (20.51) 0.183 (16.93) 
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3) First-dwelling exempted, and tax ceiling does not apply 
g = 1% & years = 85  
 
Tax rate: 1.5% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.6745 0.5875 0.6151 0.6446 0.6520 
Top 1% 20.65% 8.97% 11.13% 16.32% 18.07% 
Top 10% 53.36% 40.89% 45.32%  49.67% 50.73% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 67,546,568 14,804,589 9,259,821 2,878,785 1,291,838 
Short run ATR (%) 1.415   0.18879 0.09902 0.01632 0.00635 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
68.72 (71.54) 11.02 (44.64) 5.87 (41.84) 0.998 (37.01) 0.388 (38.95) 
 
 
4) First-dwelling exempted, and tax ceiling does apply 
 
Tax rate: 1.5% 
 M = 0 M = 500,000 M = 1,000,000 M = 5,000,000 M = 10,000,000 
Gini index 0.7301 0.6084 0.6303 0.6502 0.6553 
Top 1% 30.72% 13.63% 14.51% 17.63% 18.84% 
Top 10% 61.75% 43.92% 47.50% 50.46% 51.19% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 58,181,932 9,989,605 5,445,091 1,436,330 423,500 
Short run ATR (%) 1.28/1.42 0.137/0.188 0.063/0.099 0.0074/0.016 0.0023/0.0064 
Long run ATR (total/tax due>0) 
(%) 
63.59 (66.20) 8.80 (35.65) 4.26 (30.36) 0.54 (20) 0.17 (17.11) 
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5) First-dwelling exempted, and tax ceiling does not apply 
g = 1% & years = 85  
 
Threshold: 500,000€ 
 t = 0.5% t = 1% t = 1.5% t = 2% t = 2.5% 
Gini index 0.6301 0.6067 0.5875 0.5724 0.5609 
Top 1% 15.19% 11.75% 8.97% 7.52% 6.53% 
Top 10% 47.40% 43.85% 40.89% 38.33% 37.16% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 4,934,863 9,869,726 14,804,589 19,739,452 24,674,314 
Short run ATR (%) 0.0629 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.31 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
4.681 (18.96) 8.26 (0.33) 11.02 (44.6) 13.17 (53.4) 14.86 (60.2) 
 
 
6) First-dwelling exempted, and tax ceiling does apply 
g = 1% & years = 85  
 
Threshold: 500,000€ 
 t = 0.5% t = 1% t = 1.5% t = 2% t = 2.5% 
Gini index 0.6341 0.6190 0.6084 0.6016 0.5966 
Top 1% 16.10% 14.51% 13.63% 13.2% 12.92% 
Top 10% 47.97% 45.61% 43.92% 42.92% 42.22% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 4,226,970 7,384,567 9,989,605 11,743,463 13,111,218 
Short run ATR (%) 0.058/0.063 0.10/0,13 0.14/0.19 0.16/0.25 0.185/0.315 
Long run ATR (total / tax due>0) 
(%) 
4.33 (17.53) 7.03 (28.47) 8.80 (35.65) 10.02 (40.59) 10.93 (44.27) 
30
7) First-dwelling exempted, and tax ceiling does apply
g = 1%
Threshold: 500,000 
Tax rate: 1.5% 
Years=5 Years=10 Years =20 Years =50 Years =75 Years =100 
Gini index 0.6636 0.6592 0.6508 0.6289 0.6137 0.6010 
Top 1% 19.11% 18.69% 17.88% 15.49% 14.01% 12.79% 
Top 10% 51.25% 50.61% 49.54% 46.80 % 44.63% 42.90% 
Tax Revenue (thousand €) 9,989,605 9,989,605 9,989,605 9.989.605 9.989.605 9,989,605 
Short run ATR (%) 0.14/0.19 0.14/0.19 0.14/0.19 0.14/0.19 0.14/0.19 0.14/0.19 
Long run ATR (total/tax due>0) 
(%) 
0.68 (2.73) 1.33 (5.37) 2.56 (10.36) 5.78 (23.43) 8.01 (32.44) 9.90 (40.08) 
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